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Emotionally arousing stimuli are perceived and remembered better than neutral stimuli.
Under threat, this negativity bias is further increased. We investigated whether working
memory (WM) load can attenuate incidental memory for emotional images. Two groups
of participants performed the N -back task with two WM load levels. In one group, we
induced anxiety using a threat of shock paradigm to increase attentional processing of neg-
ative information. During task performance we incidentally and briefly flashed emotional
distracter images which prolonged response times in both load conditions. A subsequent
unannounced immediate recognition memory test revealed that when load at exposure
had been low, recognition was better for negative items in both participant groups. This
enhancement, however, was attenuated under high load, leaving performance on neutral
items unchanged regardless of the threat of shock manipulation. We conclude that both
in threat and in normal states WM load at exposure can attenuate immediate emotional
memory enhancement.
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INTRODUCTION
Frequently, emotional information enters our memory not when
we are paying particular attention to it but due to incidental per-
ception while busy with some primary task. Emotional signals are
remembered better than neutral (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006) and it
has been reported that threat-related stimuli can be processed in
an automatic manner with minimal attention (Vuilleumier et al.,
2001, 2002). Distracting visual arousing stimuli can be remem-
bered involuntarily and bias our memory of an event that hap-
pened to contain an emotional distracter leading to, for instance,
negative associations, and aversive behaviors (Baeyens et al., 2005),
as well as false memories (Smeets et al., 2008). Anxiety can signifi-
cantly modulate the degree of attention required for the processing
of threat-related stimuli, which makes anxious individuals more
prone to detect, and remember negative information (Fox, 2002).
Thus, understanding how bias in incidental memory can be influ-
enced is of interest for prevention of traumatic memories and
anxiety disorders.
Various studies have explored the use of cognitive load to reg-
ulate negative mood, since it is known that restricting attentional
resources can attenuate the emotional impact of negative stim-
uli (Erthal et al., 2005). Most of the data supports the theoretical
proposal that negative emotional expression competes with high
load task performance in the cognitive/attentional resource space
(Pessoa, 2009; Kron et al., 2010; Shafer et al., 2012), such that
anxiety and working memory (WM) performance are negatively
correlated (Vytal et al., 2012). Many studies have pointed out this
attentional capacity dependence: reported feelings are less intense
when emotion induction takes place during concurrent task per-
formance (Kron et al.,2010) or when a difficult task is administered
right after negative picture viewing (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007).
Distraction can also be used actively as an emotion regulation
strategy (Mcrae et al., 2009), and negative mood can be replaced
by cognitive task-related thoughts (Erk et al., 2007). Importantly,
cognitive load can reduce subsequent negative memories and
flashbacks when applied up to 4 h after a traumatic experience,
but only certain tasks are effective in this respect (Holmes et al.,
2010). Therefore, the investigation of the effects of cognitive load
on emotional memory formation is very important not only as
a means to regulate emotions but also in the context of affective
disorders.
Amongst the unresolved issues of emotion-cognition interac-
tions is the effect of emotional enhancement when memory is
probed immediately after encoding. Specifically, it is unknown to
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what extent the memory-prioritization is due to increased atten-
tion and to what extent other processes, such as facilitated retrieval,
memory consolidation or even increased false memory (Gallo
et al., 2009), or judgment bias (Sharot et al., 2004; Phelps and
Sharot, 2008) may play a role in this phenomenon.
Emotional enhancement of memory (EEM) observed in many
paradigms appears to be driven at least partially by enhanced atten-
tional processing (MacKay et al., 2004; Talmi et al., 2007), but at the
same time EEM benefits from the reduction in task-irrelevant pro-
cessing because it is being preserved even under divided-attention
conditions (Kensinger and Corkin, 2004). In fact, negative emo-
tional stimuli induce dual effects on cognitive control processes:
on the one hand, they interfere with ongoing processing slowing
down response times in tasks involving perceptual judgment or
detection (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Shafer et al., 2012; Talmi and
McGarry, 2012), and on the other hand, when used as targets, they
improve performance and conflict resolution due to reduction of
task-irrelevant processing (e.g., Pessoa, 2009; Hu et al., 2012).
Previous studies have often neglected to control for spatial
deployment of attention or used potentially ineffective distracters.
For instance, one study has shown that perceptual load at expo-
sure brings the recognition of fearful faces down to chance level
(Jenkins et al., 2005). In this experiment, faces were presented as
background to the letter detection task such that each trial con-
sisted of a face and a superimposed letter string. Subjects were
instructed to ignore the face and focus on the strings. One may
argue that in this design, the face was part of the target display and
not a distracter as its onset and presence were fully predictable.
In another study testing short-term memory, when neutral and
emotional words were presented very briefly so as to increase task
difficulty, EEM was abolished (Sharot et al., 2004). Yet, attention
was not controlled in that experiment leaving the question of the
extent of attentional and WM resource involvement in EEM unan-
swered. A third problem is that previous studies used paradigms
where participants are explicitly instructed to encode information
(e.g., Talmi et al., 2007), which does not always correspond to real
life situations where memories are often formed incidentally.
THIS STUDY
We tested two hypotheses based on the arousal-biased competi-
tion model of emotional memory (“ABC,”Mather and Sutherland,
2011) while addressing the shortcomings of the previous studies.
First, we tested the effect of cognitive load on short-term emo-
tional memory using distracters in a way that endows them with all
attributes of bottom-up prioritization. Second, by inducing threat
of electric shock in one of the experimental groups, we tested
whether enhancing top-down prioritization related to the partic-
ipants’ emotional state can change the competition and resulting
memory.
In two groups of participants, we tested whether WM load is
able to win the competition from bottom-up factors, namely sud-
den, unexpected, perceptually distinct, and emotionally arousing
images presented centrally in the focus of attention. Our partici-
pants performed an N -back WM task with two load levels. Using
an unannounced recognition memory test we assessed whether
the level of WM load during initial exposure differentially influ-
enced emotional memory enhancement for the distracters. In the
second group of participants, we manipulated emotional relevance
of negative images by introducing threat of electric shock, which
should lead to anxiety and arousal (Robinson et al., 2011) and as
a consequence, to prioritized processing of emotional state con-
gruent stimuli (i.e., negative pictures). The shock-threat paradigm
has been shown to reliably induce anxiety, especially if the shock is
unpredictable (Grillon et al., 2004) and for that reason is frequently
used to model behavior in anxiety disorders. Our experiment tests
whether anxiety leads to a negativity bias in immediate recognition
memory when encoding is unintentional and whether it persists
when WM load is increased.
Emotional distracters’ efficacy was controlled by ensuring their
sudden, unpredictable onset, and brief duration; spatial attention
was maintained centrally fixed as distracters appeared on top of
the task-relevant targets; and participants were instructed to con-
centrate on the primary task and ignore the distracters to minimize
the variability of cognitive set (which is a top-down factor in the
ABC model).
According to the arousal-biased competition model (Mather
and Sutherland, 2011), increased arousal in the shock-anticipation
condition could further increase the detection of the negative
affective distracters. At the same time, this condition is of particu-
lar interest because arousal should enhance goal-directed process-
ing thus inhibiting the effects of distraction on task performance
(Schupp et al., 2003). Theory also predicts that if the arousing
stimulus is not in direct competition with the task-relevant stim-
uli, then the processing of neutral goal-relevant items should be
enhanced, and the processing of less relevant stimuli should be
reduced. Based on this, two competing hypotheses can be drawn:
either the participants under threat will show a relatively larger
negativity bias in immediate recognition memory (as compared
to the neutral experimental group), or they will show overall
lower memory for all distracters due to the distracter-inhibition
effect of fearful emotional state. In addition, while we expect to
observe an EEM in the neutral group in the low load condition,
the difference in recognition accuracy between negative and the
remaining images may be larger in the group of participants tested
under threat of shock. Arousal imposes a certain level of WM
load which should lead to a general decrement in performance
in the WM task, that would now compete for scarcer cognitive
resources (Vytal et al., 2012). Based on the latter fact, as well as
on the above-mentioned evidence of load-induced reduction of
emotion processing, we expect that under high WM load, over-
all memory for distracters will be poorer in both groups, with a
possibly larger effect in the threat group, and abolition of the EEM.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In both experimental groups, 21 naïve volunteers with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision participated (group 1: mean age
23 years, SD= 2, 10 females; group 2: mean age 33 years, SD= 10,
4 females). The experiment was approved by the local ethics com-
mittee and written informed consent was obtained from every
participant. To rule out the effects of prior memory, participants
were screened for naivety: knowledge of experimental methods
of cognitive psychology and previous participation in affective
picture rating experiments were criteria for exclusion.
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MATERIALS
In total, 144 affective color pictures were used in the experiment.
Seventy-two were presented as distracters during the N -back task
(24 per emotional category; 12 in each load condition) and as tar-
gets in the recognition memory test. The other 72 pictures were
only used as decoys in the recognition memory test (24 of each
emotional category). The majority of the images (48 negative, 48
positive, and 20 neutral) was taken from a validated existing set
of affective pictures, that were tested by 86 independent raters on
emotion and arousal scales, and were controlled for luminance dif-
ferences (Overbeek et al., 2007). The negative pictures were taken
from subsets “fear” and “anger” of the database in which the aver-
age ratings on the dimension arousal were, respectively M= 1.8
(M= 2.9 on unpleasantness) and M= 1.65 (M= 3.45 on unpleas-
antness) on a five-point scale. The positive pictures were drawn
from subsets “positive surprise” and “enjoyment” in which average
arousal was respectively M= 1.8 and M= 1.95 (and respectively,
M= 2.45 andM= 2.95 on pleasantness). Please note that although
on the face value these arousal ratings appear low, the images we
selected were amongst the highest rated in the database. Our pic-
ture database was modeled after the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008), and
picture ratings within the different emotional categories did not
fundamentally differ from the IAPS ratings1. Negative images con-
tained mutilated bodies, war images, sharks, snakes, and guns, etc.
Positive images contained puppies, children, social celebrations,
and landscapes. Neutral pictures depicted people in conversation,
nature, and household objects. Twenty-eight new unrated pictures
of objects and scenes were added to the neutral pictures (mainly
images of household objects) to reach a total of 48 images per
emotional category.
We performed a Shapiro–Wilk test on the arousal ratings in
the three sets of images for which the ratings were available
(negative/positive/neutral), according to which all of them are
non-Gaussian distributed. Thus, we cross-compared the median
of the three sets using a permutation test (which is an exact test),
and adjusted the p-values for multiple testing with Bonferroni
correction. None of the cross-comparisons (negative-positive-
neutral) resulted in a statistically significant difference using the
conventional p-value threshold of 0.05. Table 1 summarizes the
arousal-pleasantness evaluation of the distracter images.
At 60 cm viewing distance the images measured between
3.7˚× 4˚ and 3.7˚× 6.3˚ in visual angle. Distracter pictures con-
tained scenes with people, animals, everyday use objects, and
sceneries but no faces in close-up.
PROCEDURE AND TASK
The participant was informed that the purpose of the experiment
was to examine cognitive performance in a WM task. The partic-
ipant sat behind a table with a laptop computer (14 inch display;
viewing distance ∼60 cm). The main tasks were WM tasks with
two load levels. The low load (LL) condition was a 1-back task; the
high load (HL) condition was a 2-back task. The N -back task is a
1According to user legal agreement, the use of IAPS images is not permitted by
for-profit institutions. To conduct psychological experiments with affective stimuli,
a new set of controlled images has been developed.
Table 1 | Mean arousal ratings of emotional pictures based on N =86
independent responders on a five-point scale.
Arousal ratings
Negative
(n=48)
Positive
(n=48)
Neutral
(n=20)a
High Load 1.83 (SD±0.26) 1.99 (SD±0.53) 1.60 (SD±0.39)
Low Load 1.61 (SD±0.16) 1.93 (SD±0.58) 1.56 (SD±0.32)
Foils 1.58 (SD±0.21) 1.85 (SD±0.47)
aRatings are available for n=20 neutral images. In addition, 28 neutral images
were used in the experiments for which independent ratings were not available.
commonly used task to engage the WM, in which subjects are pre-
sented with a continuous stream of items and instructed to press
a key when a repetition at a specified delay of N occurs.
A trial consisted of a white letter (A, B, C, D, or E; each letter
measured ∼1.76˚× 1.5˚ in visual angle) appearing for 1600 ms
centrally on the computer screen on a black background, fol-
lowed by a 400 ms blank black screen (Figure 1). Subjects were
required to respond with a key press at every trial: Left-Alt for
a match; right-Ctrl for a non-match. Letters were presented in
random order and the proportion of match and non-match tri-
als in each load condition was equal. In a random quarter (36)
of the trials a distracter picture was briefly flashed centrally for
250 ms, covering the letter. SOA of the distracter was randomly
varied between 50 and 1350 ms, to prevent anticipation. In both
load conditions, 12 negative, 12 positive, and 12 neutral distracters
were flashed. The distracter order was randomized between par-
ticipants. The participant was requested to focus on accuracy
in performance of the N -back task and to ignore the irrelevant
distracters throughout. No feedback about correct or incorrect
responses was provided before the end of the task. Each par-
ticipant performed one test run per load level, and each run
contained 144 trials (4 min 48 s). The order of load levels was
balanced across subjects. In the middle of each run, a 10 s break
was offered.
The N -back tasks were followed by an unannounced recogni-
tion memory test. Seventy-two new pictures (24 of each negative,
positive, and neutral) were added to the set of previously presented
distracters, totaling 144 images. The 144 images were displayed in
sequence, in the center of the display on a black background. Sub-
jects proceeded to the next picture by giving either of the two
response options: when they recognized having seen the picture
during the WM task (“seen”) or otherwise (“not seen”). Partici-
pants were informed beforehand that half of the images had been
presented during theN -back tasks and that half was novel. The test
was self-paced, and took ∼5–10 min. The images were presented
in random order.
All tests were presented using Presentation software (Version
14.5, 2010 Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA).
INDUCTION OF THREAT
Experimental group 2 performed the same task as group 1
while under continuous threat of a (sham) electric shock (Chua
et al., 1999). The anxiety induction procedure was specifically
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FIGURE 1 |Trial structure of the N -back tasks. In the 1-back (low load) task
a match was defined as the occurrence of two consecutive identical letters,
whereas in 2-back (high load) task a match occurred when the presented
letter was identical to the letter that had been presented one before the last.
Subjects indicated matches and non-matches with button presses. The
duration of each task was 144 trials (4 min 48 s). In 36 random trials an
emotional distracter was presented for 250 ms, with a random SOA varying
between 50 and 1350 ms.
implemented to improve attentional processing of the negative
images (Fox, 2002) and thus memory thereof.
At the beginning of the session the participant was informed
that the purpose of the experiment was to examine cognitive per-
formance under threat. After the participant was seated behind
the monitor, two ECG gel electrodes were placed on the right
wrist. These electrodes were connected to a sham shock-delivery
apparatus. The sham device was lying on the table in sight of
the participant and remained switched on, indicated by a visible
green led. The participant was told that a single electric shock
would be delivered via the wrist electrodes. This would occur
once at a random moment within the entire duration of the WM
tasks. The participant was informed that the shock could be per-
ceived as slightly painful, but was nonetheless entirely harmless.
Because electric shocks can be a powerful confounding variable,
our manipulation was limited to a threat (Laretzaki et al., 2011).
No actual electric stimuli were delivered at any time. The electrode
was removed right after the N -back task has been completed so
that the participants knew that no shocks could be delivered dur-
ing the subsequent memory test. The participants were thoroughly
debriefed at the end of experiment, with particular consideration
on the sham electrical stimulation.
VALIDATION OF ANXIETY INDUCTION
In the group that underwent the threat manipulation, at the end
of the experimental session, each participant indicated their level
of anxiety during the experiment on a Likert scale from 1 (not at
all anxious) to 5 (very anxious). After this check, the participants
were thoroughly debriefed.
DATA ANALYSIS
Of the data from the N -back tasks, the first three trials of each par-
ticipant in each block were regarded as warm-up trials and were
excluded from the analyses. Responses with latencies of 150 ms
or less were considered to be impulsive and were excluded from
the analysis. For analysis of response times on distracter trials,
only correct responses on those trials with distracters appearing
>100 ms after letter onset were selected. This criterion was applied
to avoid the possibility that a participant having missed the first,
very quick appearance of the letter had to wait until the distracter
disappeared in order to recognize the letter, which would artifi-
cially prolong response times on distracter trials. In addition, to
eliminate the trials on which it was suspected that the distracter
had no effect on the response, trials with reaction times (RT)
occurring earlier than 100 ms after distracter onset were excluded
from analysis. This selection retained ∼95% of all original trials.
Using the remaining dataset the error rate and average RT were
computed for each participant and condition.
From the data of the recognition memory test, we determined
the hit rate (proportion of correctly identified distracters that had
been shown during the N -back task) for each of the six conditions
(2 load levels× 3 emotional categories). In order to compute the
enhancement in memory due to emotion, average hit rates for each
participant in neutral images were subtracted from negative and
positive images, respectively. Thus obtained scores (referred to as
EEM) were entered into a mixed-model 3-way repeated measures
ANOVA with two independent repeated factors emotion (negative,
positive) and load (low, high); and one between-subjects factor
group (threat, no-threat). Also, for each of the three emotional
image categories, we determined the false alarm rate (decoys falsely
identified as seen during the N -back task). Subsequently we com-
puted the corrected recognition scores (hit rate – false alarm rate)
for each of the six conditions per participant.
Hit rate was computed as Hit rate = #hits#hits+#misses , and false
alarm rate as FA rate = #false alarms#false alarms + #correct rejections .
Since the foils have never been presented before, the same false
alarms rate (different for negative, positive, and neutral images)
was used to compute the recognition rate in both load conditions.
Although a corrected recognition score of −1 is possible theoreti-
cally (classifying all distracters as “unseen” while false alarming on
all decoys), in practice the corrected scores should range between
0 (pure guessing) and 1 (correctly identifying all without any false
alarms).
When considering the EEM, one must note the controversy
surrounding the origin of this phenomenon. Several influential
studies have pointed that emotion enhances the“feeling of remem-
bering” (e.g., Sharot et al., 2004; Rimmele et al., 2011) rather
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than memory accuracy per se. In addition, methodological con-
siderations suggest that the modeling of the underlying processes
of recollection and familiarity is not yet clear (e.g., the single-
vs. dual-process hypothesis, Yonelinas et al., 2010). Some stud-
ies reporting “EEM” claim that such enhancement is not due to
increased recollection but rather enhanced feeling of remembering
accompanying emotional, and especially negative items (Sharot
et al., 2004), or that it originates from higher semantic related-
ness amongst emotional items (Talmi et al., 2007). An alternative
account focuses on the model of the memory recollection process
as expressed by the signal detection theory, diffusely used in psy-
chology. This account suggests that stronger subjective feeling of
remembering leads to a more liberal bias to judge emotional items
as remembered without an increase in sensitivity (Dougal and
Rotello, 2007). To assess whether this is the case in our experi-
ment, we computed a measure of response bias – the criterion
location c.
The measure of response bias is derived from signal detection
theory and is calculated as follows:
c = − 12 [z(H ) + z(F)], where H and F are hit- and false alarm
rates, respectively (MacMillan and Creelman, 2005). This measure
was calculated for all subjects for each of the 6 conditions.
Reaction times and error rates were analyzed each using a
mixed-model 3-way repeated measures ANOVA (rANOVA) with
independent repeated factors load (low, high) and trial type (reg-
ular, distracter), and a between-subjects factor Group (threat,
no-threat). Corrected recognition scores, hit rates, as well as cri-
terion location measure c, were the dependent variables analyzed
each using the same mixed-model rANOVA, in which the two
independent repeated factors were Emotion (negative, positive,
neutral) and Load (low, high); and the between-subjects factor
was Group (threat, no-threat). False alarm rates were analyzed
with a mixed-model 2-way rANOVA with a repeated factor emo-
tion (negative, positive, neutral) and a between-subjects factor
group.
The analyses were followed by pair-wise comparisons if
appropriate, and applying Bonferroni correction for multiple-
comparisons where necessary. Levene’s test of equality of variances
and Box’s M test of homogeneity of covariances were controlled
for within-subjects and between-subjects effects, respectively, in
all statistical analyses. A threshold of p< 0.05 for Levene’s and
p< 0.001 for Box’s M, as recommended in Meyers et al. (2005),
were used to determine whether the assumptions of the mixed-
model were violated. All statistical analyses were performed using
SPSS Statistics Release 18 (IBM, Somers, NY, USA). In all reported
rANOVAs Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for violation of the
sphericity assumption were applied before determining the signif-
icance levels. To aid readability the uncorrected degrees of freedom
are reported.
RESULTS
EMOTIONAL MANIPULATION VERIFICATION
The mean measure of anxiety during the N -back tasks obtained
in N = 21 subjects in the shock-threat manipulation group
(group 2), was M= 2.76 (SD± 1.18) on a five-point Likert
scale where 1 indicated “not anxious” and 5 indicated “very
anxious.” Based on these reports we may conclude that the
participants were on average moderately affected by the fear
induction.
N -BACK TASK PERFORMANCE
Average error rates and RTs for each condition can be found
in Figure 22. The statistical analysis revealed the main effect of
load [F(1, 37)= 69.9, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.65] with longer RTs on HL
trials, and a main effect of trial type [F(1,37)= 43.7, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.54] such that responses were slower on distracter trials. No
main effect of group was discovered [F(1,37)= 2.45, p= 0.126,
ns.] nor any interactions between the factors [load× trial
type F(1,37)= 0.001, p= 0.97, ns.; load× group F(1,37)= 1.15,
p= 0.29, ns.; trial type× group F(1,37)= 2.7, p= 0.108, ns.].
Error rates in both groups were higher in the HL condi-
tion [F(1,37)= 43.08, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.54] and significantly
higher on distracter trials than on regular ones [F(1,37)= 17,
p< 0.001,η2p = 0.315]. The groups did not differ in the amount
of errors [F(1,37)= 0.274, p> 0.6, ns.] and there were no inter-
actions involving factors load or trial type (all ps> 0.4). Thus,
load was successfully manipulated and distracters significantly
interfered with performance in the N -back task.
As this analysis showed that distracters significantly slowed
RTs, we investigated whether this interference depended on the
valence of the distracter. Response times on these trials were ana-
lyzed with the mixed-model, including repeated factors load and
emotion, and a between-subjects factor group. As the main RT
analysis, this analysis showed that responses were faster in the LL
condition (M = 851 ms, SE= 37 ms) than in HL [M = 1026 ms,
SE= 48 ms; F(1,37)= 14.11,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.276]. Importantly,
neither the main effect of emotional category [F(2,74)= 0.204,
p= 0.736] nor any interactions involving factors Group and
Emotion were significant [all ps> 0.36, ns.]. Although we noted
that the experimental group performing the N -back task under
threat was somewhat faster to respond on the distracter tri-
als (M = 882.7 ms, SE= 52 ms, neutral group M = 994.6 ms,
SE= 54 ms), the main effect of group did not reach the significance
threshold [F(1,37)= 2.23, p= 0.143, ns.]. In sum, presentation of
a distracter resulted in longer response latencies at both load levels
but no differences due to emotional valence were detected. N -
back task performance in the group under threat was comparable
to that of the group without emotion induction.
RECOGNITION MEMORY ACCURACY
Hit rates for each condition are displayed in Table 23. The
data revealed a strong main effect of Emotion with highest hit
rates for negative images [F(2,76)= 10.87, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.22],
a main effect of Load with higher scores in the LL condition
[F(1,38)= 20.95, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.355] a main effect of Group
with overall lower scores in the threat group [F(1,38)= 4.6,
p= 0.038,], and an interaction Load× Emotion [F(2,76)= 15,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.28]. There were no interactions involving the
factor Group (all ps> 0.28).
2Due to data acquisition problems the N -back data of three participants in
experimental group 1 (no-threat) could not be analyzed.
3Due to data acquisition problems the memory scores of two participants in
experimental group 1 (no-threat) could not be analyzed.
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FIGURE 2 | N -back task performance of in experimental group 1 (neutral,
left) and group 2 (under threat, right). Mean error rate and mean reaction
time (both±SE of mean) as a function of working memory load and of trial
type presented for group in neutral emotional state (A,B), and under threat
(C,D). Statistical differences are denoted by **(p<0.01). No significant
difference between the groups was found (p>0.1 for RTs, p>0.6 for errors).
For all graphs, the table underneath specifies the mean scores per condition,
across participants.
Table 2 | Hit rates in experimental groups 1 (neutral) and 2 (under
threat of electric shock).
Hit rates
Negative Positive Neutral
Group 1 (neutral) Low load 0.51 (±0.05) 0.42 (±0.05) 0.31 (±0.05)
High load 0.29 (±0.04) 0.30 (±0.04) 0.35 (±0.05)
Group 2 (threat) Low load 0.44 (±0.05) 0.27 (±0.05) 0.21 (±0.04)
High load 0.23 (±0.05) 0.20 (±0.04) 0.20 (±0.04)
Values in brackets indicate SE of the Mean.
Next, the analysis was split along the factor Emotion in order to
analyze the interaction effect. This analysis resulted in a main effect
of Load in negative images [F(1,38)= 32.26, p< 0.001,η2p= 0.46],
and positive images [F(1,38)= 10.39, p= 0.003, η2p= 0.215] but
no such effect in case of neutral images [F(1,38)= 0.003, p= 0.66,
ns.]. The main effect of Group was significant in all but
in case of negative images [positive F(1,38)= 4.88, p= 0.033,
η2p= 0.11; neutral F(1,38)= 5.7, p= 0.022, η2p= 0.13; negative
F(1,38)= 1.39, p= 0.25], suggesting that the reduction in hit
rate due to WM load was similar for both experimental groups
for negative images, while the between-group difference persisted
under HL for positive and neutral images (with better scores in
the neutral group).
The analysis of the EEM scores revealed a highly signifi-
cant effect of load [F(1,38)= 24.6, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.39] with a
higher EEM in LL [M (LL)= 0.149, SE± 0.027;M (HL)=−0.017,
SE± 0.022], as well as emotion [F(1,38)= 8.56, p= 0.006,
η2p= 0.18], and an interaction load× emotion [F(1,38)= 7.39,
p= 0.01, η2p = 0.16]. There was no significant effect of group
[F(1,38)= 0.74, p= 0.39, ns.] and no significant interactions
involving the factor group (all ps> 0.19). Although not statis-
tically significant, it may be of interest that the planned com-
parisons indicated a stronger negative EEM in the threat group
[M= 0.13, SE± 0.03] than in the group with no emotion induc-
tion [M= 0.069, SE± 0.031], but the two groups did not differ in
the positive EEM (M= 0.032). The interaction was followed-up
by paired t -tests comparing the negative and positive EEM in each
load condition. This showed that the negative EEM was signifi-
cantly larger than the positive EEM in LL [t (39)= 4.16, p< 0.001]
but not in HL [t (39)= 0.29, p> 0.7, ns.]. One-sample t -tests
also confirmed that the EEMs in low load were different from
0 [negative t (39)= 6.7, p< 0.001; positive t (39)= 2.83, p< 0.01],
in contrast to the HL condition, where the EEM was abolished
[negative t (39)=−0.36, p> 0.7; positive t(39)=−0.81, p> 0.4].
The results of the analysis of false alarm rates (Table 3) revealed
a main effect of emotional category with higher FA rates for emo-
tional items [F(2,76)= 7.475, p= 0.003, η2p = 0.164] and no main
effect of group [F(1,38)= 2.04, p= 0.16, ns.] and no interaction
group× emotion (p> 0.95), suggesting that the nominal ratio of
negative false memories was no higher in the participants under
threat than in those in a neutral state.
In the analysis of the corrected recognition scores from
the memory test (Figure 3), we found a main effect of load
[F(1,38)= 20.81, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.35], confirming that recog-
nition was lower for images displayed in the HL condition,
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but no main effect of emotional category [F(2,76)= 1.375,
p= 0.26, η2p= 0.35]. There was, however, a significant interac-
tion of load× emotional category [F(2,76)= 15.04, p< 0.001,
η2p= 0.28]. We did not find any interactions involving the fac-
tor Group [group× load F(1,38)< 0.08, p= 0.95, η2p < 0.0001;
group× valence F(2,76)= 1.16, p.318, η2p= 0.03], nor a triple
interaction between group type, valence, and load. Even though
the recognition accuracy in the non-threat group was slightly
higher than in the threat group [in LL M= 0.24 (SD= 0.24)
vs. M= 0.19 (SD= 0.18) in threat group; and in HL M= 0.14
(SD= 0.19) vs. M= 0.10 (SD= 0.14), respectively], this effect was
statistically not significant [main effect of group F(1,38)= 1.38,
p= 0.246, ns.].
Splitting this overall ANOVA across the factor “emotional
category,” revealed that the load× emotional category interac-
tion was driven by the difference in recognition of emotional
images between the two load levels [negative HL-LL t (39)= 5.73,
p< 0.001 and positive HL-LL t (39)= 3.18, p= 0.009], while
load had no effect on recognition accuracy of neutral pictures
[t (39)=−0.526, p= 0.602]. From this result we may conclude
that the two groups do not differ in recognition memory accuracy
for emotional distracters presented during high and low WM load
Table 3 | False alarm rates in Experimental Groups 1 (neutral) and 2
(under threat of electric shock).
False alarm rates
Negative Positive Neutral
Group 1 (neutral) 0.21 (±0.05) 0.19 (±0.04) 0.13 (±0.04)
Group 2 (threat) 0.15 (±0.04) 0.13 (±0.03) 0.07 (±0.02)
Values in brackets indicate SE of the Mean.
and that load leads to elimination of the memory advantage for
emotional but not neutral images.
Calculation of c for all subjects in this experiment showed that
they were most liberal, i.e., most likely to respond“seen”to negative
images followed by positive, and that they were most conservative
in recognizing the neutral images (results reported in Table 4). In
the neutral group, the subjects were generally conservative in their
answers showing a bias to respond “no” most of the time (57% in
LL and 67.5% in HL) even though they had been instructed that
they had seen 50% of the images during the task. In the threat
group, the participants were very conservative in their responses
responding “unseen” 70% of the time upon viewing pictures pre-
sented in low- and 80% in HL condition (detailed results in Table 4
below).
Previous research on emotional words suggests that response
bias shifts toward most liberal judgment of items as “seen” when
the words were negative, less so for positive, and most conserv-
ative for neutral (Dougal and Rotello, 2007, Exp. 1A). This led
Table 4 | Measure of response bias derived from signal detection
theory: mean criterion location measure c in recognition memory
responses for experimental groups 1 and 2.
Criterion location c
Negative Positive Neutral
Group 1 (neutral) Low load 0.48 (±0.12) 0.65 (±0.11) 0.99 (±0.13)
High load 0.79 (±0.13) 0.82 (±0.12) 0.93 (±0.13)
Group 2 (threat) Low load 0.75 (±0.13) 1.08 (±0.15) 1.33 (±0.11)
High load 1.12 (±0.16) 1.21 (±0.14) 1.37 (±0.11)
Higher values indicatemore conservative responding. Group 1 (no emotion induc-
tion) N=19 participants; Group 2 (threat of electric shock) N=21. Values in
brackets indicate SE of the Mean.
FIGURE 3 | Recognition memory performance of the neutral (A) and
threat group (B). Mean corrected recognition score (±SE of mean) as a
function of emotional category and the level of working memory (WM)
load during initial presentation of the distracter. The table underneath the
graph specifies the mean scores across participants per condition. There
were significant main effects of WM load and interaction of load and
emotional category (***p<0.001). There was no significant difference
between the groups (p>0.2, ns.). WM load significantly reduced the
performance for negative and positive but not neutral distracters
(**p<0.01).
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us to suspect that we might find a similar bias in our experi-
mental groups. A recent study using the same emotion induction
paradigm as used here, reported in addition an annihilation of
positivity bias (Robinson et al., 2011), which is another expected
observation that the measure c will provide in characterizing the
between-group differences in this study. Specifically, we expected
to observe this effect in a group× emotion interaction in response
bias.
Analyzing the response bias measure c (reported in Table 4),
we discovered a main effect of group [F(1,38)= 5.25, p= 0.028,
η2p= 0.12] with the experimental group under threat of shock
having a stronger bias to respond “no” (more conservative). This
tendency was confirmed by the higher hit rates in the neutral
group. We further found highly significant main effects of load
[F(1,38)= 18,71, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.33] with more conservative
responses in HL, and a main effect of emotion [F(2,76)= 15.97,
p< 0.001,η2p= 0.29] with highest (most liberal) c values for
negative, followed by positive and then neutral images, and an
interaction between factors load and emotion [F(2,76)= 14.9,
p< 0.001,η2p= 0.28 ]. No interactions involving factor group were
observed [all ps> 0.58]. Splitting the analysis along the factor
emotion revealed that increased load did not decrease the response
bias criterion only in the case of neutral images [no main effect
of load F(1,38)= 0.062, p= 0.8, ns], while it did have an effect
on negative [F(1,38)= 31.86, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.456] and positive
images [F(1,38)= 9.79, p= 0.003, η2p= 0.20]. This result echoes
the findings in corrected recognition rates. Conversely, similarly
to the hit rates analysis, the two groups of participants were signif-
icantly different in terms of response bias change in recognizing
positive and neutral [effect of group, F(1,38)= 5.18, p= 0.029,
η2p= 0.13; F(1,38)= 5.67, p= 0.022, η2p= 0.12, respectively], but
not the negative images [F(1,38)= 2.59, p= 0.12, ns.]. No inter-
action of load with group was noted for any image type. This
means that WM load application resulted in an equal decrease in
hit rates and response bias shift toward more conservative for neg-
ative images in both participants in neutral state and under threat,
while recognition of neutral and positive images remained overall
more conservative in the threat group.
DISCUSSION
We examined the effect of WM load on incidental memory for
emotional stimuli in two groups of participants: in neutral affec-
tive state and under threat of electric shock. The participants
performed the N -back task at low- and high-WM load while
an affective distracter image was briefly flashed within the cen-
tral focus of attention in a random quarter of the trials, so as to
prevent anticipation of distracter presentation.
In both groups, we observed that distracters slowed down the
RTs and increased the error rates, suggesting that the images were
perceived and interfered with the cognitive processing of the WM
task. Although the participants under threat showed slightly faster
RTs, the groups did not significantly differ in terms of task perfor-
mance indicating that the threat manipulation did not have any
significant impact on N -back task performance. Importantly, we
did not find any differential effect in RTs for the three types of
distracter images, indicating that emotional distracters displayed
very briefly (250 ms) do not interfere with main task performance
more than neutral images, in contrast with previous studies that
used longer emotional image exposure (Kensinger and Corkin,
2003).
Furthermore, in both groups of participants we observed a sim-
ilar enhancement of immediate recognition memory for negative
and positive stimuli based on hit rates, reflecting the frequently
reported advantage of emotional stimuli to enhance immediate
memory (Cahill and McGaugh, 1998; Rozin and Royzman, 2001;
Talmi et al., 2008; Mather and Sutherland, 2011). EEM was equally
present in both groups in the LL condition, with stronger enhance-
ment for negative pictures and no significant between-group dif-
ference. Thus, we did not observe a stronger negativity bias in
immediate recognition memory in participants under threat of
shock as would have been predicted by increased processing of
mood-congruent stimuli (Mitte, 2008; Robinson et al., 2011).
LOAD ERASES THE ADVANTAGE OF EMOTIONAL STIMULI
We observed a reduction in the number of correctly recognized
items (hit rate) in the memory test for pictures presented dur-
ing the high WM load condition. Importantly, the reduction was
observed for the emotional items but not for neutral ones suggest-
ing that arousing pictures may have been easier to ignore under
high WM load. The participants in the threat induction group
overall had worse memory for the distracter pictures which is con-
sistent with the observation that arousal (fear of electric shock, in
this case) imposes a level of cognitive load that taxes WM and
limits the processing of task-irrelevant items, albeit emotionally
charged (Mather and Sutherland, 2011; Vytal et al., 2012).
The elimination of EEM due to WM load is in line with the
arousal-biased competition in memory (Mather and Sutherland,
2011) that proposes that emotional arousal enhances memory for
prioritized information at the cost of goal-irrelevant information,
regardless of the perceptual or affective details of the prioritized
item. In our experiments, the letters in the N -back task were
the goal-relevant items and took priority over the emotional dis-
tracters when the task difficulty and load on the WM was high.
As a result, emotional pictures were not remembered better than
neutral pictures.
It is known that items that signal emotional relevance are
more likely to be processed in the presence of competing dis-
tracters than non-emotional items (Öhman et al., 2001), and
studies report that emotional memory enhancement is stronger
when attentional resources are restricted (Kensinger and Corkin,
2004; Talmi et al., 2007). Yet, our result shows that their memory
trace can be weakened when WM load during or soon after pre-
sentation is sufficiently high. Interestingly, our results indicate that
not recognition memory in general but enhancement of memory
for emotional images depends on WM capacity upon encoding
since the recognition accuracy for neutral images was very similar
in both load levels in both experiments (Table 2; Figure 3).
Current evidence suggests that the immediate memory
advantage of emotional items stems partly from enhanced
attention and sensory processing (Vuilleumier, 2005; Talmi et al.,
2008), with negative items being particularly likely to benefit
from fast amygdala-mediated visual processing during short expo-
sure times (Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010; Ritchey et al., 2011).
However, some studies report that cognitive effort may lead to a
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reduction of memory. For example, Kensinger and Corkin (2004)
found memory reduction for explicitly encoded negative words
under certain circumstances – when the participants concurrently
performed a difficult auditory discrimination task and the words
were low-arousing. Most recently, Talmi and McGarry (2012)
reported that the emotional memory enhancement can only be
moderated to the level of neutral items when the latter are paid
full attention to and emotional items are only partly attended in
a dual-task condition. Our result is in line with these findings
and further extends them showing that cognitive load leads to
an overall reduction in recognition memory for negative visual
scenes that are sparsely presented and encoded in a purely inci-
dental manner. We thus conclude that application of WM load
during arousing image viewing can attenuate the emotional bias
in immediate recognition memory.
Emotional stimuli may be remembered better because they
attract more attention upon encoding (Hamann, 2001). Such
attentional enhancement could cause the negative memory
enhancement that we observed in LL, but it cannot fully account
for the result in HL where no emotional prioritization was
observed even though the distracters significantly interfered with
response times in both conditions. The result was also not dri-
ven by inattentional blindness in the HL condition because in
all conditions the recognition rates corrected for guessing are
well above chance level and the result pattern was replicated in
both groups of participants. In fact, there is evidence that atten-
tion allocation is not the sole factor behind immediate memory
enhancement (MacKay et al., 2004) and it has been suggested that
under conditions of diminished attentional capacity due to con-
current cognitive load, distracters are perceived automatically and
involuntarily (Lavie, 2000). Taken together, it is unlikely that the
observed attenuation of emotional bias in recognition memory
is due to impaired visual processing of distracters at exposure
caused by reduced perceptual capacity under HL. It may rather
imply that load interrupts a later stage of processing of emo-
tional information, such as short-term memory or immediate
memory consolidation, leading to deteriorated performance upon
retrieval.
False alarm rates (Table 3) did not significantly differ between
the two experimental groups, displaying a clear effect of emo-
tional category, with highest scores for negative, followed by
positive and neutral images. This result is consistent with pre-
vious reports showing a higher amount of false memories for
emotional images (Gallo et al., 2009; Gallo, 2010), as well as a
shift toward most liberal response bias for negative, followed by
positive stimuli (Dougal and Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008).
In fact, all participants were most liberal in judging negative
items as remembered, demonstrating that response bias plays a
role in the EEM (Phelps and Sharot, 2008), also upon immediate
testing.
A potential limitation of our study is the fact that in the mood-
manipulation group we used the threat of shock paradigm without
actually delivering the electric shock that could have resulted in a
low or no anxiety in some participants. The subjective responses
given by the participants on a Likert scale is a modest proof
of anxiety as it is difficult to judge whether the average score
(2.76) indicates a sufficiently high level of experienced anxiety,
nor can a verifying comparison of this result be made, as no
measurement of anxiety was taken in the neutral experimental
group.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that a challenging cognitive
task employing WM load can diminish the formation of inci-
dental emotional memories, presumably by (1) exhausting the
cognitive resources that could otherwise be captured by salient
arousing distracters, and (2) shifting focus so that all distracters,
emotional, or neutral, become goal-irrelevant. Notwithstanding
the non-difference between the two experimental groups, we have
found a very robust effect of load on incidental emotional mem-
ory, and suggest that engaging in a neutral task that loads the WM,
especially in situations of stress and anxiety, can be a method to not
only provide distraction from current emotional state (Van Dillen
and Koole, 2007) but also to tune down future negative memories
of perceived events.
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